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PROTECTIONISM, PUNISHMENT AND 
PARIAHS: SEX OFFENDERS AND 
RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS 
Meghan Silē Towers* 
INTRODUCTION 
At the highest levels of government, the U.S. Congress 
recently approved the Adam Walsh1 Child Protection and Safety 
Act of 2006,2 which unifies the sex offender registration system 
nationally and provides funding for states and local governments 
to create and research electronic monitoring programs targeting 
sex offenders.3 Meanwhile, at a more local level, states, towns 
and municipalities have begun to pass strict laws regarding the 
disclosure of registered sex offenders and their residences. Sex 
                                                          
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2007; A.B. Lafayette College, 2004. 
The author wishes to thank her parents, Cathy and Dan Towers; 
grandparents, Tom and Dorothy Fielding; brother, Ryan Towers and sister 
Danielle Towers for their love, laughter and guidance. She would also like to 
thank Lee Jacobs, for holding the second ring; Dori Milner, for nights on the 
couch and sugar packets; Andy Grey, for always providing a beverage; 
Robert Ontell, Hail to the Victors; Jessica Gary, for her help; and Paul, for 
warnings of lurking danger. In addition, she would like to extend a special 
thanks to the entire staff of the JLP for their brazen bluebooking. 
1 Adam Walsh was 6 years old when he was abducted and murdered. He 
was the son of John and Revé Walsh, who later created “America’s Most 
Wanted” and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children in 
response to their son’s tragic death. Reid Praises Adam Walsh Child 
Protection and Safety Act, U.S. NEWSWIRE July 20, 2006. 
2 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, H.R. 4472, 
109th Cong. (2006) (enacted). 
3 Id. 
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offenders, 96% of whom are men,4 who have been tried, 
convicted and punished in accordance with the criminal justice 
system, are restricted by these local and federal laws. But after 
their time is served and their debt to society is paid, there will 
be increasingly no redemption, no clean slate, but rather a 
growing list of rules and prohibitions that greatly restricts the 
lives these individuals can lead following their jail time. While 
most people consider it a small price to pay for the safety of 
America’s children, a handful of individuals and groups5 have 
begun to question these laws as representing a system of ex post 
facto punishment that makes pariahs out of sex offenders. 
Congressional acts named after brutally murdered little girls, 
like Megan’s Law,6 provide for a strict system of registering and 
monitoring convicted sex offenders. The effectiveness and 
fairness of these laws have been examined by the judiciary and 
the public—with almost universal acceptance and support.7 
However, the public has recently thought these restrictions 
insufficient. As high profile cases of abduction, sexual torture 
and murder flood America’s television screens, local politicians 
are trying new ways to keep children safe from sexual 
predators.8 Towns in Iowa,9 Oklahoma, and twelve other states10 
                                                          
4 Lawrence Greenfeld, An Analysis of Data on Rape and Sexual Assault: 
Sex Offenses and Offenders, 21 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS (1997). 
5 The American Civil Liberties Union is one group that has consistently 
challenged residency restrictions on behalf of many “John Does.” 
6 Megan’s Law, HR 2137, 104th Cong. (1996) (enacted). 
7 See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) (holding 
that current dangerousness of a convicted sex offender irrelevant to whether 
they should be included in the state’s registry) and Gunderson v. Hvaas, 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21783 (2002) (upholding that a sex offender who pled to a 
lesser sentence still had to register with state because circumstance of offense 
similar to those of higher offenses and since statute was regulatory right of 
presumed innocence did not apply). 
8 Manuel Roig-Franzia, Miami Beach Mayor Seeks to Exclude Sex 
Offenders, WASHINGTON POST, April 25, 2005, at A03 (discussing the death 
of Jessica Lunsford and Sarah Lunde and the effect these deaths had on the 
media, public and subsequently politics). 
9 Julie Hilden, Are the Pedophile-Free Zones Constitutional? The Issues 
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are initiating legislation that limits access of certain areas to 
registered sex offenders. Specifically, registered sex offenders 
are prevented from living or working near schools, playgrounds 
and other locations frequented by children.11 This intersection of 
property rights and civil sanctions, public fear and private shame 
brings an important discussion to the public forum: when does 
prevention cross the line into punishment and how does local 
government reconcile the freedom of movement and rights of 
property with residence restrictions that look similar to 
restrictive zoning? 
This note looks at these new zoning regulations through the 
lens of property and practicality. First this note will examine the 
framework provided by The City of Philadelphia v. New 
Jersey,12 regarding a state isolating itself from common 
problems, and apply the same analysis to a comparable problem 
of statewide sex offender residency restrictions like those in 
Iowa. Next this note will take the framework regarding 
exclusionary zoning laws as set forth in the landmark property 
case Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount 
Laurel13 and apply it to modern residence restrictions regarding 
registered sex offenders. By employing these principals to 
residency restrictions this note will seek to create a method for 
understanding how individual property rights and common 
responsibility interact with local fears and public concerns. It 
will also reveal how the current form of residency restrictions 
have an unfair effect of pushing the burden of treating and 
                                                          
they May Raise, FINDLAW, Aug. 30, 2005, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ 
hilden/20050830.html (examining residence restrictions in Iowa and revealing 
possible constitutional challenges). 
10 In Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 714 (2005) the court identifies twelve 
other states that have residency restrictions for sex offenders, including: 
Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon and Tennessee. 
11 See DEVON B. ADAMS, SUMMARY OF STATE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY 
DISSEMINATION PROCEDURES, (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1999). 
12 The City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). 
13 Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 
67 N.J. 151 (1975) [hereinafter Mt. Laurel]. 
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monitoring convicted sex offenders onto towns and 
municipalities with smaller populations, smaller budgets and 
fewer resources. In the end, this system will only compound the 
problem of dealing with sex offenders. Finally, this note will 
examine the criticism of residence restrictions and address 
possible alternative solutions, such as housing arrangements, 
additional monitoring, education and individualized attention. 
I. SEX  OFFENDER LAWS 
There are various laws14 throughout the United States 
designed to help law enforcement officials and communities fight 
sex offenders and other child predators.15 This note specifically 
focuses on residency restrictions imposed on convicted sex 
offenders following their parole from prison, though registries 
will also be discussed. Residency restrictions are relatively new 
restraints and part of a larger system that restricts and controls 
paroled sex offenders. These restrictions placed on sex offenders 
                                                          
14 One such measure is the AMBER Alert System. AMBER stands for 
America’s Missing: Broadcast Emergency Response, and it is named after 
Amber Hagerman, a 9-year old who was kidnapped and brutally murdered 
while riding her bicycle in Arlington, Texas. Following her death, in 1996 
local police and Dallas-Fort Worth broadcasters developed an early warning 
system. The system requires that after there has been a kidnapping that meets 
certain specific criteria all local radio and TV broadcasters as well as state 
transportation officials are notified. These various groups issue alerts 
interrupting regular broadcasting and reaching anyone listening to a radio, 
watching TV or traveling on roadways. This system spread throughout the 
nation. Now all 50 states have AMBER Alert Systems and the Department of 
Justice is currently working to create a seamless national system. U.S. 
Department of Justice, AMBER Alert: History and Frequently Asked 
Questions, http://www.amberalert.gov/about/faqs.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 
2006). 
15 For the context of this note the term “sex offenders” refers to adults 
who have committed sexual crimes against children. At times there will be 
distinctions drawn between child molesters, or sex offenders whose sexual 
crime with children did not include intercourse, and statutory rapists, whose 
sexual crime with children included intercourse. PATRICK A. LANGAN, ERICA 
L. SCHMITT AND MATTHEW R. DUROSE, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS 
RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994 4 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2003). 
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are often coupled with other requirements, most notably 
registry requirements.16 
A. Registries 
Registry requirements are the most common form of control 
exercised over paroled sex offenders. All fifty states have sex 
offender registration acts (“SORAs”) that require sex offenders 
to register with the state, and often require notification of the 
offender’s status to neighbors and local law enforcement.17 Sex 
offender registries are kept by local police and contain the 
names, addresses and criminal histories of sex offenders residing 
within a given area.18 Disclosure laws require that schools and 
other interested parties be informed of sex offenders living 
nearby.19 Many have the information available online, along 
with pictures and maps of neighborhoods pinpointing the 
residences of sex offenders.20 In addition, many sites also 
include a disclaimer requiring that a user acknowledges that the 
information on the site might include mistakes and that its use is 
for legitimate purposes.21 
                                                          
16 The same states that have residence restrictions also have registry 
requirements. Compare, Adams, supra note 11 and Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 
700 (2005). 
17 Jane A. Small, Who are the people in your neighborhood? Due 
Process, Public Protection, and Sex Offender Notification Laws, 74 
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1451, 1451 (Nov. 1999) (examining current SORAs and 
their related problems). 
18 See Adams, supra note 11. 
19 Id. 
20 For example, the Kentucky State Registration website includes pictures 
of offenders. http://www.kentuckystatepolice.org/sor.htm#search. The 
California State Registration website includes a searchable map according to 
city, county, zip code or school that will pinpoint where a sex offender lives 
within a certain radius. http://meganslaw.ca.gov (click “Continue”; then 
check the “I have read the disclaimer and agree to these terms and 
conditions” box; then click “Continue”). 
21 Websites that list Sex Offenders often contain cautions that the 
information found on the site cannot be used for criminal persecutions, such 
as harassment, and that such a use of the information is subject to 
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The push for this form of surveillance came on the heels of 
the high profile murder of Megan Kanka.22 Megan lived in a 
reportedly quiet neighborhood in Hamilton Township, New 
Jersey.23 On July 29, 1994 she was lured into the house of a 
neighbor with the promise of a puppy.24 The neighbor was Jesse 
Timmendequas, a man previously convicted twice of sexual 
crimes against children.25 Timmendequas lived with two other 
convicted sex offenders across the street from Megan’s home.26 
After luring Megan into the house, Timmendequas raped her 
and then killed her by strangling her with a belt to ensure her 
silence.27 Timmendequas eventually confessed to the murder and 
led a search party to the field where Megan’s body was found.28 
Timmendequas was sentenced to death and is as of the date of 
this publication awaiting execution.29 
The story of Megan Kanka was highly publicized and the 
New Jersey legislature, galvanized by public outcry, passed 
legislation that required sex offenders to register with local 
police upon parole.30 The registry laws also require disclosure of 
the name and address of the sex offender to neighbors, local 
schools and other places frequented by children.31 If a sex 
offender moves, then he or she must notify the police.32 
                                                          
prosecution. 
22 Bureau of Justice Assistance, Background on the Act and Its 
Amendments, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/what/2a2jwactbackground.html 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2005). 
23 Seamus McGraw, Suffer the Children: The Story of Megan’s Law, 
Court TV, http://www.crimelibrary.com/serial_killers/predators/kanka/1.html 
(last visited Dec. 11, 2006). 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 McGraw, supra note 23. 
29 Id. 
30 Division of Criminal Justice, New Jersey Office of the Attorney 
General, Megan’s Law, http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/megan/ (last visited 
Sept. 25, 2005). 
31 Id. 
32 There have been many problems with the sex offender registries. 
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Following New Jersey’s lead, other states ratified sex 
offender registry laws.33 On a national level, in 1996 President 
Clinton signed an updated version of the Jacob Wetterling 
Crimes Against Children Act.34 This act had a provision 
popularly referred to as Megan’s Law,35 which required every 
state to develop some sort of procedure for notifying the public 
when a sex offender is released into their community.36 The 
procedures differ from state to state,37 but common elements 
include the release of personal information such as names, 
addresses, criminal history and even photographs to neighbors, 
schools and any party that expresses interest in the 
information.38 For example,39 in Alabama if an offender qualifies 
for notification, a flyer with his or her photograph is mailed to 
all residents living within a specified distance.40 In Rhode 
Island, all schools, day care facilities and other related 
                                                          
Cases of mistaken identity have caused innocent people to be treated like 
criminals. Also, in some states the definition of a “sex offender” is not 
limited to people that have committed violent sexual crimes with children but 
includes other groups that pose no danger to society. Men convicted of 
consensual sodomy with women or other men are considered sex offenders. 
As are women convicted of prostitution and any one convicted of statutory 
rape. These offenders are lumped in with violent offenders—those guilty of 
child molestation, rape and other sexual violence. See generally, National 
Institute of Corrections, Fifty State Survey on Sex Offender Registry (2006), 
http://www.nicic.org/Library/021768. 
33 For example, New York signed their own version of Megan’s Law in 
July 1995. New York State Sex Offender Registry, 
http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/nsor/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2005). 
34 Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent 
Offender Registration Act, Title 17, 108 Stat. 2038, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 14071. 
35 Pub.L. 104-145, May 17, 1996, 110 Stat. 1345. 
36 Id. 
37 For a comprehensive list of state sex offender registries see ADAMS, 
supra note 11. This report also lists how each state registry can be accessed 
and what information is available to the general public. Id. 
38 Small, supra note 17, at 1461. 
39 For a complete listing of the notification procedures of each state see 
ADAMS, supra note 11. 
40 Id. at 3. 
MEGHAN 3/7/2007 1:25 PM 
298 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
institutions are notified.41 Parents of children attending such 
places are also notified.42 Although these registries remain 
immensely popular, as this note argues, there are also some 
problems associated with them. 
Sex Offender Registry Acts or SORAs are often criticized as 
overbroad—snaring anyone convicted of a sexual crime.43 They 
also raise concerns over such potential problems as improper 
notification, vigilantism, false sense of security and ex post facto 
or double jeopardy issues.44 SORAs have been challenged, 
usually under the Due Process guarantee of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.45 Some state courts have found that SORAs 
implicate a Due Process interest, but very few have found a 
liberty or property interest involved.46 
B. Constitutionality of Registration Laws 
Federally, the constitutionality of SORAs have been 
addressed recently by the Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe.47 
Smith challenged the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act, 
which required sex offenders incarcerated in Alaska to register 
with the Department of Corrections within thirty days of their 
release.48 Depending on the level of offense, a convicted sex 
offender would have to ratify the information annually or 
                                                          
41 Id. at 7. 
42 Id. 
43 See supra note 32 for a further discussion. 
44 Small, supra note 17, at 1465-470. 
45 See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) (discussing 
that current dangerousness of a convicted sex offender is irrelevant to 
whether they should be included in the state’s registry) and Gunderson v. 
Hvaas, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21783 (2002) (holding that a sex offender 
who pled to a lesser sentence still had to register with state because 
circumstance of offense similar to those of higher offenses and since the 
statute was regulatory right of presumed innocence did not apply). 
46 Given that current laws affect where sex offenders can live and also 
their property rights—a Fourteenth Amendment challenge may be stronger 
now that zoning laws have come into play. 
47 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
48 Id. at 90-91. 
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quarterly for a specified number of years.49 The state would also 
publish certain information about the registrant, such as address, 
date and place of conviction and sentence etc., on the internet.50 
In its analysis of the constitutionality of this Act, the Court 
first examined whether “the legislature meant the statute to 
establish civil proceedings.”51 If the Court found legislative 
intent to impose punishment then the law would be deemed 
invalid under the Ex Post Facto Clause.52 However, if the Court 
found legislative intent to “enact a regulatory scheme that is 
civil and non-punitive”53 then the Court would look to determine 
whether the scheme is so punitive in either purpose or effect “as 
to negate the State’s intention to deem it civil.”54 If the law 
passed these tests then it is deemed constitutional.55 
In Smith the Supreme Court concluded that Alaska’s Sex 
Offender Registration Act was non-punitive; therefore, asking 
sex offenders to register did not violate the Ex Post Facto 
Clause of the Constitution.56 The Court found the Act was 
within the interests of the state to protect the health and safety of 
its citizens.57 Based on the language of the statute and the 
legislative record, the Court found that facially the statute was 
designed to protect the public.58 The Court noted that when a 
state uses its power to protect the health and safety of its 
citizens, there is a presumption that the legislative intent was to 
                                                          
49 Id. at 90. 
50 Id. at 91. 
51 Id. at 92. 
52 Id. The Ex Post Facto Clause is found in the United States 
Constitution Article I, § 9, Clause 3, and forbids the enactment of ex post 
facto laws, which are laws that apply retroactively and may criminalize an 
action that was legal when it was committed. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
264-65 (8th Ed. 2004). 
53 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 105-106. 
57 Id. 
58 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 93 (2003). 
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exercise the state’s regulatory power.59 This logic, therefore, 
defeated the argument that the state intended to impose 
punishment with the registration requirement.60 
Next, the Court examined Alaska’s implementation of the 
Registration Act. Again the Court ruled that the scheme was 
non-punitive since the Act had “contemplated distinctly civil 
procedures”61 for its administration.62 The Court then examined 
the effects the Act had on the paroled sex offenders. The Court 
analyzed the registry requirements by examining: 
whether, in its necessary operation, the regulatory 
scheme: has been regarded in our history and 
traditions as a punishment; imposes an affirmative 
disability or restraint; promotes the traditional aims of 
punishment; has a rational connection to a 
nonpunitive purpose; or is excessive with respect to 
this purpose.63 
The court then examined each of these issues to determine if the 
Act was non-punitive. 
If a state chooses to punish then it might adopt a traditional 
form of punishment so that the public will recognize it as such.64 
Comparing the registration requirements with colonial shaming, 
the Court stated that the aim of such punishments was typically 
to impose permanent stigmas on the offenders which effectively 
ostracized the guilty.65 The court also noted that “the most 
serious offenders were banished,66 after which they could neither 
                                                          
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 One example was allowing the managerial aspects of the regime to be 
handled by the same body that dealt with civil matters. Id. at 96. 
62 Id. at 96. 
63 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003). 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 98. 
66 In Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 719-20 (2005), which will be 
discussed in detail in Part III. B., one of the arguments used against 
residency restrictions is that they are similar to the colonial punishment of 
banishment, which the Court here acknowledges as historically one of the 
worst punishments. Smith, 538 U.S. 84, 98 (2003). 
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return to their original community, nor reputation tarnished, be 
admitted easily into a new one.”67 In comparison, the Court 
ruled that the stigma from registry restrictions resulted from the 
“dissemination of accurate information about a criminal record, 
most of which is already public.”68 The Court further noted that 
widespread public access to registry information was necessary 
to promote the goals of the scheme, namely those of public 
protection.69 Therefore, the Court held that registry requirements 
do not parallel what historically has been thought of as 
punishment nor did they promote the traditional aims of 
punishment.70 
In Smith, the Court then examined whether the registration 
requirements imposed an affirmative disability or restraint on the 
offenders.71 There was no physical restraint imposed by the Act, 
and the Court observed that offenders would not be completely 
unemployable nor would they be unable to find places to live, 
stating that the Act caused no “substantial occupational or 
housing disadvantages for former sex offenders that would not 
have otherwise occurred through the use of routine background 
checks by employers and landlords.”72 After determining that 
there was no affirmative disability or restraint imposed, the 
Court quickly dealt with the Act’s rational connection to a non-
putative purpose.73 The Court held that the risk of recidivism 
posed by sex offenders74 combined with the non-excessive 
                                                          
67 Smith, 538 U.S. 84, 98 (2003). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 99. 
70 See id. at 98-99. 
71 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 98-99 (2003). 
72 Id. at 100. 
73 Id. at 102-03. 
74 According to the court’s reading of U.S. Department of Justice 
reports, “when convicted sex offenders reenter society they are much more 
likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or 
sexual assault.” Id. at 102. However, as will be discussed in Section III.D, of 
this note recidivist rates among criminals arrested for non-sexual crimes were 
much higher. Therefore, while sex offenders may be the most likely to 
commit another rape, they do not have the highest recidivist rate among 
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duration of the reporting requirements resulted in the fact that 
the Act was reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective.75 In 
the end, the Court held the Act constitutional.76 
While Smith v. Doe established that statewide Sex Offender 
Registries were constitutional, some of the framework discussed 
by the Court supports the idea that residence restrictions might 
be impermissible or at least subject to scrutiny.77 Specifically, 
the finding that registries result in no additional housing 
disadvantages for sex offenders,78 do not “ostracize” them,79 and 
are dissimilar from “banishment”80 is in sharp contrast with the 
realities of the newest limits imposed on sex offenders: residence 
restrictions. 
C. Residence Restrictions 
Residence restrictions are statutory laws that control where 
sex offenders can live under the terms of their parole.81 The 
most common form of these restrictions limits sex offenders 
from residing within specified distances from schools, day care 
centers, playgrounds, parks and other places where children 
congregate.82 
Residence restrictions have become popular in recent years. 
Several states have enacted strict rules regarding where 
                                                          
convicts as is often reported. 
75 Id. at 103-06. 
76 Id. at 106. 
77 This note will apply the framework from Smith v. Doe to residence 
restrictions later in the note, after residence restrictions have been discussed 
and explained. See Section C.3, supra. 
78 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 101 (2003). 
79 Id. at 99. 
80 Id. at 98. 
81 Jill S. Levenson and Leo P. Cotter, The Impact of Sex Offender 
Resident Restrictions: 1,000 Feet from Danger or One Step from Absurd?, 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF OFFENDER THERAPY AND COMPARATIVE 
CRIMINOLOGY 168, 175 (2005). 
82 See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 715 n.14 (2005). 
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convicted sex offenders may reside.83 The rules are diverse and 
vary greatly from state to state. For example, in Arkansas a 
registered sex offender cannot live within 2,000 feet of 
elementary or secondary schools and daycare facilities.84 In 
California, convicted sex offenders may not reside within any 
single family dwelling with another sex offender unless they are 
related by blood, marriage or adoption.85 In Illinois, the 
residence restriction states that a child sex offender may not 
“knowingly reside within 500 feet of a playground or facility 
providing programs or services exclusively directed toward 
persons under eighteen years of age.”86 The Illinois restriction 
also includes a section that forbids approaching, contacting or 
communicating with children by registered sex offenders in 
parks or other areas frequented by children.87 Similar residence 
restrictions have been adopted in some form by many states, 
including large states such as New York and California.88 
In addition to state residence restrictions, some municipalities 
and other smaller geopolitical areas have also enacted strict laws 
limiting where sex offenders can reside. For example, the mayor 
of Miami Beach garnered considerable attention for pushing 
legislation that creates a buffer zone around places where 
children regularly congregate and the homes of sex offenders.89 
This zone stretches for 2,500 feet around such areas and makes 
it almost impossible for sex offenders to live within Miami 
Beach.90 While Florida91 already has statewide residence 
                                                          
83 See Devon B. Adams, Summary of State Sex Offender Registry 
Dissemination Procedures, (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1999). 
84 A.C.A. § 5-14-128 (2005). 
85 Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 3003.5 (2005). 
86 720 ILCS 5/11-9.4 (2005). 
87 Id. 
88 Other states include: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, 
Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon and 
Tennessee. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 715 (2005). 
89 Manuel Roig-Franzia, Miami Beach Mayer Seeks to Exclude Sex 
Offenders: Wider Buffer Covers Nearly Entire City, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 
25, 2005, at A3. 
90 Id. 
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restrictions for sex offenders, some municipalities are 
discovering that the public fear of sex offenders warrants stricter 
limitations. 
1. Municipal Residency Restriction—Hamilton Township, NJ 
Hamilton Township was the home of Megan Kanka and the 
birthplace of the movement in the 1990s to register sex 
offenders.92 Now Hamilton Township is at the forefront of 
another trend—residency restrictions. On May 17, 2005 the 
Township Council of Hamilton Township voted unanimously in 
favor of Ordinance 05-017, which extended residence 
restrictions for sex offenders to 2,500 feet from a school, 
playground, childcare center or park.93 Hamilton Township still 
enacted one of the most restrictive requirements in the United 
States, even though New Jersey already had a residency 
restriction in place.94 However, this more restrictive rule makes 
Hamilton Township the fortified castle in the already restrictive 
fort that is New Jersey. 
2. State Residency Restriction—Iowa 
In 2002 the Iowa State legislature passed a residency 
restriction that applied to convicted sex offenders who had been 
involved in certain offenses with a minor.95 The residence 
restriction required that such offenders live outside of 2000 feet 
of a school or a registered child care facility.96 At the time of its 
                                                          
91 See FLA. STAT. § 948.30 (2005). 
92 Bureau of Justice Assistance, Background on the Act and Its 
Amendments, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/what/2a2jwactbackground.html 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2005). 
93 Township of Hamilton, Meeting Minutes—Township Council  
(May 17, 2005) available at, http://www.hamiltonnj.com/index.htm?/ 
announcements/council_agendas_minutes.htm [hereinafter Hamilton Township 
Meeting Minutes]. 
94 See Adams, supra note 11. 
95 Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2005). 
96 Id. 
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passage, this state-wide restriction was one of the harshest and 
resulted in a great deal of controversy.97 
3. Smith v. Doe as applied to Residence Restrictions 
Smith98 examined a challenge to Alaska’s Sex Offender 
Registry law. Since Smith is the only recent Supreme Court case 
dealing with the regulation of paroled sex offenders, it is a valid 
framework for contemplating how the Supreme Court would 
handle a similar challenge to residence restrictions. Some of the 
arguments that the Court considered in Smith are also applicable 
to analyzing a challenge to residence restrictions. While others 
do not have the same effect when applied to residence 
restrictions. 
Since residence restrictions limit where sex offenders may 
reside based on proximity to schools, parks, playgrounds and 
other sites as previously discussed, such restrictions do exactly 
what the Court implied was improper.99 For example, Iowa’s 
residence limitations resulted in restricted areas that 
encompassed the majority of available housing in cities and in 
small towns because the presence of a single school or child care 
center could cause the entire town to be off limits to sex 
offenders.100 Calling this a housing disadvantage, as this note 
argues, is an understatement. As such, residence restrictions, 
unlike registries similar to the Alaskan registry as examined in 
Doe v. Smith, do impose additional housing disadvantages for 
sex offenders, and therefore, would defeat one argument of the 
Supreme Court in favor of registries. 
In addition, in Smith, the Court pointed out that since the 
                                                          
97 http://www.iowastatedaily.com/media/storage/paper818/news/2006/01/ 
25/Opinion/Editorial.Residency.Restrictions.Create.More.Problems.Than.The
y.Solve1503545.shtml?norewrite200611141402&sourcedomain=www.iowasta
tedaily.com 
98 Smith was discussed supra, Section I.B. 
99 Previously, in Smith, the Court held that since registry requirements 
do not limit where sex offenders can live or restrict their movement they are 
within a state’s police powers. See supra Section I.B. 
100 Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d at 706. 
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registries were not similar to colonial punishment, then it was 
unlikely that the registries were punitive.101 However, residence 
restrictions effectively ostracize the guilty and also ban offenders 
from living in certain areas. If there are very few areas in cities 
and larger towns where sex offenders can live, then the result of 
residence restrictions will be to herd registered offenders 
together into these permissible areas. Eventually, extrapolating 
on the effect of residence restrictions, entire neighborhoods 
might become populated largely by registered sex offenders, 
creating modern day penal enclaves in cities and towns across 
America.102 Forcing sex offenders to live together might have 
the additional adverse effect of preventing their reintegration 
into society and instigating further instances of abuse.103 Thus, it 
appears residence restrictions have the effect of ostracizing and 
banning offenders. Once again they are more punitive in effect 
than registries and defeat yet another prong of Smith that 
allowed the Supreme Court to find such restrictions 
constitutional. 
Using the framework of the leading Supreme Court case that 
addresses sex offender parole requirements similar to residence 
restrictions reveals that residence restrictions raise concerns of 
constitutionality that registries do not. A challenge of residence 
restrictions as a punitive measure in violation of the Ex Post 
Facto Clause of the Constitution might be successful.104 In 
addition, there are cases from a purely public policy prospective 
that raise additional concerns of the validity of residence 
restrictions.105 
                                                          
101 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 99 (2003). 
102 Cf. Lisa Henderson, Comment, Sex Offenders: You are Now Free To 
Move About the Country, 73 UMKC L. Rev. 797, 804 (2005). 
103 Id. at 802. 
104 See infra Section III.B for the discussion concerning Doe v. Miller. 
In Miller, the Eighth circuit dismissed these arguments. However, there are a 
variety of possible challenges to the Court’s reasoning. 
105 See infra Section V. 
MEGHAN 3/7/2007 1:25 PM 
 SEX OFFENDERS AND RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS 307 
II. RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS AND PROTECTIONISM 
Sex offender residence restrictions have protectionist 
tendencies. This section seeks to compare residence restrictions 
to past state efforts to isolate themselves from a problem that 
crosses state lines. First, a prior decision of the Supreme Court 
dealing with state protectionism will be examined. Then the 
framework provided by the Supreme Court will be used to 
address protectionism in regards to Iowa residence restrictions. 
A. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey 
In early 1974, New Jersey enacted a statutory provision that 
prohibited the importation of most “solid or liquid waste which 
originated or was collected outside of the territorial limits of the 
State.”106 Cities in other states that had arrangements with 
private landfill operators in New Jersey challenged this law.107 
While the trial court declared the law unconstitutional because it 
interfered with interstate commerce, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court held that the statute was a legitimate exercise in the 
protection of vital health and environmental concerns that posed 
no great burden upon interstate commerce and was, therefore, 
permissible.108 The U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the relevance 
of the purported environmental protection the law was supposed 
to provide.109 Then the Court held that discriminating against 
articles of commerce110 coming from outside the state was 
impermissible under the Commerce Cause unless there was 
another way to distinguish the articles besides their place of 
origin.111 The Court ruled with the understanding that small 
burdens on interstate commerce would be tolerated provided that 
                                                          
106 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 618 (1978). 
107 Id. at 619. 
108 Id. at 620. 
109 Id. 
110 The Supreme Court adopted the view of the New Jersey Supreme 
Court that the movement of waste constituted commerce for the purpose of an 
analysis of constitutionality under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 621. 
111 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1975). 
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a state legislature had the goal and effect of protecting the health 
and safety of that state’s citizens.112 In addition, the Court also 
stated: “What is crucial is the attempt by one State to isolate 
itself from a problem common to many by erecting a barrier 
against the movement of interstate trade.”113 The Court went on 
to scold New Jersey for attempting to “saddle those outside the 
State with the entire burden”114 associated with reducing waste 
in New Jersey.115 
Sex offender residency restrictions facially appear to have 
very little in common with New Jersey waste restrictions, but 
important analogies can be drawn. In both situations states are 
faced with an undesirable. No one wants sex offenders living 
next door, just as no one wants to live next to a landfill. Yet 
both of these unwanted problems exist in this country, in all 
states and in all communities. The question then becomes 
whether it is permissible for one state to isolate itself from a 
problem common to many by erecting effective barriers—in this 
case residence restrictions—that severely limit where sex 
offenders may live within a state. 
B. Doe v. Miller 
In Doe v. Miller,116 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit examined the constitutionality of Iowa Code § 692A.2A, 
which prohibited a person convicted of sex offenses against 
minors from residing within 2,000 feet of a school or registered 
child care facility.117 The district court held that this law was 
constitutional because it fell within the state’s power to protect 
the health and safety of the citizens of Iowa, and that on its face, 
the residency restrictions were not unconstitutional.118 The U.S. 
                                                          
112 Id. at 623-24. 
113 Id. at 628. 
114 Id. at 629. 
115 Id. 
116 Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 700 (8th Cir. 2005). 
117 Id. at 705 (citing Iowa Code § 692.2A (2002)). 
118 Id. at 704. 
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Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.119 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit first addressed the reasoning 
of the lower court in finding Iowa Code § 692A.2A 
unconstitutional.120 The circuit court dismissed the lower court’s 
conclusion that the residence restrictions encompassed such a 
large majority of the land in cities and larger towns that the only 
available housing left for sex offenders was in small enclaves in 
the cities or in rural areas where available housing was “not 
necessarily readily available.”121 The circuit court pointed out 
that “while the residency restriction may have exacerbated a 
housing problem for the plaintiffs, not all their difficulty was 
caused by the statute.”122 The court found that housing problems 
occurred for many of the plaintiffs not because of the residence 
restriction, but because of their own money troubles or status as 
convicted felons; factors that would remain even if the statute 
were repealed.123 
The Court then turned to the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process challenge to § 692A.2A.124 First, the court dismissed 
the challenge based on procedural due process, pointing out that 
the statute was not vague and that the legislature could draw 
classifications amongst felons provided that the “substantive 
rule” does not conflict with provisions of the constitution.125 
Substantive due process was the next challenge to 
§ 692A.2A.126 The plaintiffs claimed that the statute infringed on 
their “right to privacy and choice in family matters, the right to 
travel and ‘the fundamental right to live where you want.’”127 
To support this the plaintiffs applied the reasoning from Moore 
v. City of East Cleveland, which dealt with zoning restrictions 
                                                          
119 Id. at 705. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 706. 
122 Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 706 (8th Cir. 2005). 
123 Id. at 706. 
124 Id. at 708. 
125 Id. at 708-10. 
126 Id. at 709. 
127 Id. 
MEGHAN 3/7/2007 1:25 PM 
310 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
that attempted to reach into the home and limit the type of 
relatives that could live together in order to qualify as a “single-
family home.”128 The Eighth Circuit dismissed this comparison, 
pointing out that the law did not restrict who may live with sex 
offenders, but merely restricted where the residence they co-
habited could be located.129 Therefore, the court did not find 
infringement on matters relating to marriage and the family that 
would require strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.130 
The court also rejected the argument that the residence 
restriction infringed on the right to travel.131 “The Iowa statute 
imposes no obstacle to a sex offender’s entry into Iowa, and it 
does not erect an actual barrier to interstate movement.”132 The 
court declined to examine whether there was a fundamental right 
to intrastate travel.133 The court also declined to find that “the 
right to live where you want” was a fundamental right so deeply 
entrenched in the history and tradition of the United States that 
to deny its protection would sacrifice liberty and justice.134 
After dismissing these arguments, the Eighth Circuit was 
then required to review the statute to determine if it “rationally 
advanced some legitimate governmental purpose.”135 Because 
“precise statistical data is unavailable and human behavior is 
necessarily unpredictable”136 the court stated that the authority of 
the Iowa legislature in erecting measures to protect the health 
and safety of its citizens was broad.137 Citing Conn. Dept’t of 
                                                          
128 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (holding that a zoning ordinance that defined 
family in such a way as to prohibit a grandmother from living with her two 
grandsons in an area zoned for “single family residences” was 
unconstitutional). 
129 Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 710 (8th Cir. 2005). 
130 Id. at 711. 
131 Id. at 712. 
132 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
133 Id. at 713. 
134 Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 714 (8th Cir. 2005). 
135 Id. at 715 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
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Publ. Safety v. Doe,138 the court held that it is rational to believe 
that sex offenders present dangers to society and that the danger 
of convicted sex offenders committing new sexual crimes upon 
their reentry into society is high.139 Because of these dangers the 
court felt that the restriction advanced a legitimate government 
purpose and that the legislature of a state is the proper 
decision-maker in determining the appropriate distance.140 
The court then rejected a challenge based on the 
constitutional right against self-incrimination found in the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments141 and turned to the issue of 
whether these residence restrictions constituted an attempt at ex 
post facto punishment.142 Since the Iowa General Assembly did 
not intend to create a law of criminal punishment,143 the court 
had to inquire as to whether the purpose or effect of the law was 
so punitive that it violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.144 Because 
the court believed that the purpose of the law was not 
punitive,145 the judges then turned to the question of whether the 
effect of the law was punitive.146 
Like the Supreme Court in Smith,147 the plaintiffs in Miller 
pointed to the similarities between residence restrictions and 
banishment in an attempt to prove punitive effect.148 However, 
                                                          
138 Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 1 (2003) (dealing with a 
constitutional challenge to website that registered sex offenders’ whereabouts 
and level of dangerousness pursuant to Connecticut’s version of Megan’s 
Law). 
139 Miller, 405 F.3d at 715. 
140 Id. 
141 The petitioners argued that requiring sex offenders to register forced 
them to provide information that incriminated themselves in violation of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 716 (8th 
Cir. 2005). 
142 Id. at 718. 
143 Id. 
144 See id. at 719 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 98 (2003). 
148 See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 719 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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the Eighth Circuit did not find this argument compelling for two 
reasons. First, the residence restriction only affected where 
offenders may reside but did not “expel” them from the 
community.149 Since offenders could still access every area of 
Iowa “for employment, to conduct commercial transactions, or 
for any purpose other then establishing a residence”150 the 
comparison to banishment failed.151 Second, the court pointed 
out the “novelty” of residence restrictions, indicating that it 
could not be similar to a traditional means of punishment 
because it was a new idea.152 
Turning to the issue of whether the law promoted traditional 
punishment aims of deterrence and retribution, the Eighth 
Circuit found that the law intended to deter and that it was not 
overly retributive.153 In addition, the law did not impose an 
affirmative disability or restraint.154 The judges compared the 
civil commitment of the mentally ill to residence restrictions155 
and pointed out that in the first case courts have consistently 
held that such confinement “does not necessarily impose 
punishment because it bears a reasonable relationship to a 
‘legitimate nonpunitive objective.’”156 Finally, the court 
examined whether Iowa Code § 692A.2A had a rational 
                                                          
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Of course, if the goal of residence restrictions is to keep convicted 
sex offenders away from potential victims then this argument is nonsensical. 
True, sex offenders are prevented from living next to schools, but as the 
Court points out with this argument, which does not deny them access to 
these areas for almost any other purpose. Id. at 712. 
152 Id. at 720. 
153 Id. 
154  Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 720 (8th Cir. 2005). 
155 Interestingly enough, some states attempt to keep sexual offenders 
confined to mental hospitals following their release from prison, citing that 
sexual offenders have mental instability and should be confined for the good 
of society. For an interesting discussion of current state efforts to confine 
sexual offenders to mental hospitals using current laws directed at the 
dangerously mental ill see Pushing the Envelope, THE NEW YORK TIMES, 
Dec. 7, 2005. 
156 Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 720 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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connection to a non-punitive purpose.157 Again, the court felt 
that the law fit the purpose of protecting the public health and 
safety and was not so overbroad as to become punitive.158 In the 
end the Eighth Circuit upheld Iowa Code § 692A.2A and 
reversed the lower court decision that had found this residence 
restriction unconstitutional. 
C. Miller In Light of Philadelphia 
The Eighth Circuit failed to consider in Miller the 
repercussions that Iowa’s residence restriction might have on 
neighboring states. The Iowa Code § 692A.2A is not nearly as 
restrictive as the statutory provision struck down in Philadelphia 
nor does it obviously affect interstate commerce, but a few 
parallels still exist. 
First, in both cases states attempt to deal with a problem by 
restricting its ability to exist within the state. In Philadelphia, 
this meant barring waste from entering into New Jersey’s 
borders. Miller’s goal was to bar sex offenders from residing 
within certain zones. In both cases the legislatures are attempting 
to prevent their states from being the receptacle of a distasteful 
problem.159 
As the court pointed out in Philadelphia, it is unfair for one 
state to place the burden of dealing with a difficult problem onto 
those outside of the state.160 Again, while Iowa is not ejecting all 
sex offenders from within its borders nor preventing others from 
moving into the state, it is now more difficult for sex offenders 
                                                          
157 Id. at 721. 
158 Id. at 722. 
159 Since the decision of the Eighth Circuit more states have added 
restrictive sex offender residence requirements. In 2006 Georgia passed a 
1,000 feet restriction that not only included schools, playgrounds and parks 
but also bus stops and churches. In describing the purpose of the law Rep. 
Jerry Keen stated, “We don’t want these type of people [sex offenders] 
staying in our state.” Greg Bluestein, Sex Offender Challenges Ga. Residency 
Restrictions, WASHINGTON POST, June 16, 2006. Such an attitude clearly 
portrays isolationist tendencies by a lawmaker. 
160 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1973). 
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to live in Iowa than in other states without residency 
restrictions.161 Since each state has the burden of monitoring the 
sex offenders that live within its borders, the effect of state-wide 
residence restrictions might put a greater burden on states that 
do not have such restrictions. 
Also, sex offenders who desire to move to Iowa might be 
deterred by the presence of residence restrictions. This could 
have an inadvertent effect on interstate commerce and also 
interstate real estate transactions. While sex offenders may not 
represent a large percentage of the population this type of 
residency restriction might have some effect on interstate 
commerce.162 
III. RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS AND EXCLUSIONARY ZONING 
In examining the form and the general effect of residence 
restrictions, one comparison with property law becomes 
apparent: exclusionary zoning. Exclusionary zoning, for the 
purposes of this note, refers to the efforts of groups within 
localities to use the zoning code to achieve specific social goals. 
Exclusionary zoning is defined as “land use control regulations 
which singly or in concert tend to exclude persons of low or 
moderate income from the zoning municipality.”163 
A. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of 
Mount Laurel 
In 1975, the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided the 
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount 
Laurel.164 Various parties brought suit against the Township on 
                                                          
161 For example, Time Magazine reported that an anonymous sex 
offender planned to uproot from Mason City, Iowa and move to a 
neighboring state such as Nebraska or South Dakota. Anita Hamilton, 
Banning the Bad Guys, TIME, Sept. 5, 2005, at 72. 
162 Such a study is beyond the resources of the author, but is worth 
contemplating. 
163 83 AM. JUR. 2D Zoning and Planning § 74 (2005). 
164 Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151 (1975). 
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the grounds that the land use regulations passed by the 
municipality had the discriminatory effect of excluding low and 
moderate income families from the area.165 
Mount Laurel’s problems can be traced to Philadelphia’s 
rapid expansion and the growing number of highways running 
through New Jersey.166 As more and more people moved into 
this suburb of Philadelphia the number and extent of local 
zoning ordinances also grew.167 The township tried to limit its 
growth to a certain type.168 For example, 29.2% of the land in 
the township was zoned for industry.169 However, only certain 
types of industry were permitted—including light manufacturing, 
farms and offices.170 Another 1.2% of the total land in the 
township was zoned for retail business.171 The remaining land 
was divided into four residential zones, all of which only 
permitted single-family, detached housing with one house per 
lot.172 Within Mt. Laurel there was no area allotted for attached 
townhouses, apartments (outside of those permitted on farms) or 
mobile homes.173 The court noted that these general ordinance 
requirements “realistically allow only homes within the financial 
reach of persons of at least middle income.”174 The result of this 
exclusionary zoning was to push low and middle-income families 
out of Mt. Laurel.175 
Mt. Laurel was, at the time of this case, involved in the then 
new idea of “planned unit development” (PUD).176 Instead of 
housing requirements defined by local legislation, PUD allows 
for the town to make a contract with real estate developers, 
                                                          
165 Id. at 157. 
166 Id. at 162. 
167 Id. at 161-62. 
168 Id. 
169 Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 162 (1975). 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 163. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 164. 
175 See Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151 (1975). 
176 Id. at 166. 
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which uses broad guidelines for building housing.177 While the 
developers in this case had included attached townhouses and a 
variety of apartments, they would not have been available to 
people of low to moderate-income.178 Once again the township 
had arranged for housing that would not accommodate people of 
below middle-income.179 
While the court accepted the argument that the ordinances 
were not created with a discriminatory purpose, it nonetheless 
found that the zoning regulations had the effect of excluding low 
and moderate income families.180 The court called such patterns 
of land use regulations “selfish and parochial,”181 and stated that 
such laws build walls around towns to keep out “those people or 
entities not adding favorably”182 to the desires of the local 
community.183 
When examining whether such one-sided land use regulations 
were legal under the New Jersey constitution the court asked 
whether municipalities could validly use zoning to make it 
impossible to provide low and middle income housing and 
therefore prevent people from these economic categories from 
living within the municipality.184 Since zoning laws are 
encompassed within New Jersey’s police power the court asked 
whether these land use regulations promoted public health, 
safety, morals or the general welfare.185 The court also stated 
that “a zoning enactment which is contrary to the general 
welfare is invalid.”186 
In deciding whether the land use regulations promoted the 
general welfare the court emphasized that “when regulation does 
have a substantial external impact the welfare of the state’s 
                                                          
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 167. 
179 Id. 
180 Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 170 (1975). 
181 Id. at 171. 
182 Id. 
183 Cf. id. 
184 Id. at 173. 
185 Id. at 175. 
186 Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 175 (1975). 
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citizens beyond the borders of the particular municipality cannot 
be disregarded and must be recognized and served.”187 The 
court went on to explain that the municipal regulations were 
designed to create a favorable tax base and ultimately found that 
these zoning regulations were not permissible because 
“municipalities must zone primarily for the living welfare of 
people and not for the benefit of the local tax rate.”188 Since 
housing is one of the “basic human needs,”189 the requirement 
for adequate housing for all of Mount Laurel’s citizens 
outweighed the community’s desire for a favorable tax base. 
Essential to the court’s reasoning was the determination that 
land use regulations could not be allowed to “foreclose the 
opportunity of the classes of people mentioned for low and 
moderate income housing”190 especially considering that the 
municipality must shoulder a “fair share of the present and 
prospective regional need [for low and middle income 
housing].”191 The court emphasizes that “every municipality . . . 
must bear its fair share of the regional burden” of providing low 
and middle income housing.192 The interests of citizens 
throughout the region and state were taken into consideration, 
and in light of those interests, the court found Mount Laurel’s 
zoning regulations impermissible. 
B.  Property Analogies 
Examining the facts in Mt. Laurel reveals several similarities 
between those exclusionary zoning regulations and residence 
restrictions for sex offenders. First, in both cases local 
municipalities sought to use a form of zoning, an element of 
property law, to exclude an unwanted group. In both situations 
the effect of these laws is to push the unwanted group outside of 
                                                          
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 188. 
189 Id. at 178. 
190 Id. at 174. 
191 Id. 
192 Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 189 (1975). 
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the borders of the town. While in the abstract this seems 
feasible, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Mt. Laurel pointed 
out that this only shifted the burden to the rest of the state.193 
The same effect can be seen in the case of residence restrictions 
for sex offenders. “While states attempt to force sex offenders to 
live elsewhere with the intent of making their communities safer, 
inevitably the new community where the offenders will be living 
is forced to deal with those problems, which it may be ill-
equipped to do.”194 The sweeping-the-problem-under-the-carpet 
approach to sex offenders might be very attractive to each 
community in the short term. The end result is not to fix the 
problem but only to allow it to fester elsewhere. 
IV. CRITICISMS OF RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS 
While this note focuses on the similarities between residence 
restrictions and exclusionary zoning, it is important to briefly 
address the criticisms leveled at residence restrictions. Residence 
restrictions are designed to address “stranger danger.”195 This 
term refers to the idea that sex offenders prey on children that 
they do not know.196 In reality, this is a highly inaccurate myth. 
In fact, amongst juvenile female victims only 7.5% were 
assaulted by a stranger, while 58.7% were assaulted by an 
acquaintance and 33.9% were assaulted by a family member.197 
Juvenile male victims were even less likely to be assaulted by a 
stranger where only 5% of young male victims were assaulted 
by strangers, while 59.2% were assaulted by acquaintances and 
35.8% were assaulted by family members.198 This data 
contradicts the common fear that a stranger will be the one to 
                                                          
193 Id. at 164. 
194 Michael J. Duster, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: State Attempts to 
Banish Sex Offenders, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 711, 714 (2005). 
195 Levenson & Cotter, supra note 81, at 175. 
196 Id. 
197 HOWARD N. SNYDER, SEXUAL ASSAULT OF YOUNG CHILDREN AS 
REPORTED TO LAW ENFORCEMENt: VICTIM, INCIDENT AND OFFENDER 
CHARACTERISTICS, 10 (National Center for Juvenile Justice 2000). 
198 Id. 
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assault a child. In fact, based on the statistics, the people 
surrounding children daily are the ones potentially posing the 
greatest danger.199 Residence restrictions are useless to prevent 
acquaintances or family members from assaulting children. They 
also do not stop strangers from assaulting children since they do 
not prevent registered sex offenders from entering a restricted 
zone, just from living within one.200 
Residence restrictions also prevent sex offenders from living 
near areas where children congregate but do not prevent an 
offender from living next door to minors.201 Nor do the laws 
account for the fact that sex offenders are more likely to travel 
outside of their neighborhood to avoid recognition if they 
attempt to re-offend.202 For example, in a recent study, one 
offender stated: “You don’t want me to live near a school where 
the kids are when I’m at work. The way it is now, when I get 
home from work, they are home too—right next door.”203 The 
statistics and studies regarding juvenile sexual assault do not 
appear to support the current form of residence restrictions. 
V. PUSHING THE PARIAH ASIDE & OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
The attractiveness of residence restrictions can be obvious. 
First, from a legislative view, restrictions allow elected officials 
to quickly respond to their constituents’ concerns. Taking a 
stand against sex offenders and for America’s children is a 
politically popular move.204 In addition, residence restrictions 
are inexpensive, especially in comparison to further 
incarceration, treatment programs, and other forms of 
monitoring. The primary cost of the restriction is born by the 
sex offender himself, not by the tax payers of any community. 
                                                          
199 Id. 
200 See supra Part I.C. 
201 An exhaustive look into the statute of each state that had residency 
restrictions as of Nov. 17, 2005 revealed no provision that prohibited sex 
offenders from moving next door to a minor. 
202 Levenson & Lotter, supra note 81, at 174. 
203 Id. at 175. 
204 Cf. Henderson, supra note 102, at 801. 
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Finally, residence restrictions are easy to implement. Again, the 
primary responsibility falls on the offender himself as a 
condition of his parole.205 Since all fifty states have registry 
requirements,206 it will be clear to parole officers and other law 
enforcement officials when a registered offender is violating the 
residence restriction.207 
A. Efficiency Argument 
Courts often consider the assignment of risk, especially when 
faced with a dangerous situation or condition. Courts will 
consider what party is best suited to prevent the contemplated 
danger and ask which party should be assigned the risk, in 
addition to which party can most effectively prevent the risk 
from occurring. From a purely economic standpoint, it is usually 
the creator of a product that is best suited to prevent the danger 
because they are most knowledgeable and it is generally most 
convenient for them to do so. In the case of sex offenders, it is 
clear that they are in the best position to prevent further 
molestation, but the issue then becomes who is in the best 
position to watch over these offenders. Is it larger municipalities 
with larger police forces and more funding but also with higher 
populations of children? Or is it smaller municipalities in more 
rural areas? This note argues that the best party to assume this 
risk is the larger municipalities, and that pushing sex offenders 
aside, outside of larger towns through residence restrictions will 
eventually overwhelm the more rural areas to which sex 
offenders move.208 
The Minnesota legislature rejected statewide residence 
restrictions partly for this reason: “proximity restrictions will 
have the effect of restricting [offenders] to less populated areas, 
                                                          
205 See Small, supra note 17. 
206 Id. at 1451. 
207 Statutes requiring registration include provisions that provide 
consequences for sex offenders that fail to register. See infra note 21 for a 
further discussion. 
208 C.f. Duster, supra note 194, at 174. 
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with fewer supervising agents and fewer services for offenders 
(i.e., employment, education, and treatment).”209 As Mt. Laurel 
Township and Philadelphia point out, there are some problems 
that are common to an entire region and even to the entire 
nation.210 To isolate one’s community from this problem might 
seem attractive and certainly helps resolve fears of the “not in 
my backyard” philosophy. However, it is a selfish and 
ultimately futile solution. 
B. Effect on Property 
One effect of residence restrictions on real property is to 
decrease the pool of potential homebuyers available to people 
wanting to sell their property that is located inside a restricted 
zone.211 In addition, residence restrictions act as a type of 
zoning and affect how homeowners are able to use their 
property. For example, if a homeowner wanted to form a half-
way house within a restricted area they could not. Restrictions 
on property diminish the transferability of land and thus 
residence restrictions negatively affect innocent property 
owners.212 
Also at issue is who will be responsible for ensuring 
restrictions are met. The burden could be placed on those selling 
property. Additional title insurance might be required to cover 
the sale of property to a buyer who is unable to assume 
residency due to a past conviction of a sex crime. Then comes 
the issue of whether sellers would be guilty of fraud if they 
know that their home is within a restricted zone but do not 
                                                          
209 Minn. Dep’t of Corr., Level Three Sex Offenders Residential 
Placement Issues: 2003 Report to the Legislature 11 (2003). 
210 See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628; Southern 
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 172-
74 (the problems addressed in these cases are not related to sex offenders). 
211 As of Oct. 3, 2005 there were nearly 500,000 registered sex 
offenders. See Robert F. Worth, Exiling Sex Offenders from Town, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 3, 2005, at B1. 
212 See generally, PROPERTY Chs. 6-11 (Jesse Dukeminier and James E. 
Kreier eds., 1981). 
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reveal this information upon the sale. Another consideration is 
the effect on the recordation system for deeds—each recorded 
deed might need to be modified to reflect this new land use 
restriction. These issues are only a few that affect all home 
owners in states with residence restrictions and that have not 
been addressed by the legislature, along with residence 
restrictions against sex offenders.213 
C. Public Misperception 
In May 2005 when Hamilton Township passed its latest 
residence restriction, the Township Council opened the floor to 
the public in order to ensure all concerns were addressed.214 The 
comments from the townspeople of Hamilton Township215 reveal 
some common misconceptions about sex offenders and also 
expose the failure to appreciate the consequences of registry 
restrictions. 
Hamilton Township’s mayor, Glen D. Gilmore stated: 
Tonight we’re hoping to enact an ordinance that I 
believe will add another strand to the safety net that 
protects our children . . . This ordinance is a 
common sense ordinance . . . I’m hopeful that tonight 
Hamilton Township will lead our state in enacting a 
law that’s common sense and enacting a law that says 
convicted child sex offenders, convicted child sex 
offenders that have a high rate of re-offense will not 
be permitted to live within twenty-five hundred feet 
of a school, playground, a child care center or a 
park. That is common sense and that is something 
that I hope tonight will add to our measures to protect 
those who are too young to protect themselves.216 
                                                          
213 See Henderson, supra note 102, at 822-24 (for a good discussion on 
the repercussions that residence restrictions have on home sales). 
214 Hamilton Township Meeting Minutes, supra note 93. 
215 Obviously these selected statements do not represent every opinion on 
this issue. 
216 Hamilton Township Meeting Minutes, supra note 93, at 4. 
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This statement, while passionate and understandable, contains 
many misconceptions about child molesters. First, it is not a 
common sense measure that preventing child molesters from 
living near schools and other designated areas will prevent them 
from molesting those children.217 In 2005, J.S. Levenson and 
L.P. Cottor conducted a survey of 135 sex offenders living in 
Florida in order to study the impact that residence restrictions 
had on the rehabilitation and reintegration of sex offenders back 
into society.218 As Levenson and Cottor’s study reveals, sex 
offenders prefer to offend away from their place of residence.219 
In addition, child sex offenders have the lowest comparative rate 
of recidivism among all convicted felons.220 
Danielle Ference, a member of Hamilton Township and a 
participant at the meeting, stated: 
To me, it has nothing to do with Civil Rights. It’s got 
nothing to do with race or religion. It’s about a 
predator, a convicted sexual predator and keeping 
them away from exactly what they prey our children. 
I don’t know about you, and I don’t know what the 
statistics are, but I do know every time I read the 
paper (sic) but I know every time I read the paper, 
and I read about one of these cases, nine times out of 
ten, it is a repeat sex offender. They may serve their 
time, but what they take from these children, the 
lucky ones that live to talk about it, is something that 
they can never get back. They won’t get it back in 
three to five years. This ban is important to me, 
maybe more than most . . . These children are our 
future and I can assure you the effects of something 
                                                          
217 J.S. Levenson and L.P Cottor, The Impact of Sex Offender Residence 
Restrictions: 1,000 Feet from Danger or One Step from Absurd?, 49 INT’L J. 
OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 168 (2005). 
218 Id. 
219 Id. (emphasis added). 
220 Patrick A. Langan, Erica L. Schmitt, and Matthew R. Durose, 
Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from Prison in 1994, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs), Nov. 
2003, at 30. 
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like this has on a child will stay with them for ever. 
It changes the way that they think and the way that 
they live their lives. How they are gonna look at 
other people and how they are gonna view the 
world.221 
Ference’s comment reveals a common problem with residence 
restrictions. The problem is that residence restrictions, while 
banning sex offenders from certain areas of a municipality, do 
not bar sex offenders from coming into contact with children.222 
Sex offenders might not be able to live near parks, schools or 
day care centers, but they certainly can walk by them whenever 
they so choose. Residence restrictions are defined by restricting 
residence—they do not restrict movement, of sex offenders or of 
children. 
In addition, the strictest residence restrictions might protect 
one town at the expense of another. In areas where residence 
restrictions prevent sex offenders from living within a certain 
municipality there is still the municipality next door. What many 
people fail to realize is that they are not banning child molesters 
from their own town without consequences—they are merely 
sending these “predators” to the next town over to prey on 
someone else’s child. 
Again it is clear from Ference’s statement that there are still 
misconceptions regarding the recidivism of sexual offenders.223 
According to a study by the Department of Justice,224 based on 
                                                          
221 Hamilton Township Meeting Minutes, supra note 93, at 5. 
222 See generally Roig-Franzia, supra note 8. The current sex offender 
residence restrictions on the books do not prevent registered sex offenders 
from speaking with or contacting children. 
223 It has been surmised that such misconceptions have driven legislatures 
to create registration and notification statutes. These misconceptions might 
also explain the attractiveness of residence restrictions to legislatures 
pressured by their constituents to “do more” about child molestation. See 
Eileen K. Fry-Bowers, Controversy and Consequence in California: Choosing 
between Children and the Constitution, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 889, 906 
(2004). 
224 The Department of Justice examined arrest records for 9,691 male 
sex offenders who had been released from prisons in fifteen states. See 
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official arrest records, 5.3% of sex offenders released in 1994 
were rearrested for a new sex crime within the first three years 
following their release.225 The same study reveals that 2.2% of 
child molesters and statutory rapists were rearrested within three 
years for sex crimes against a child.226 In contrast, recidivism 
rates among prisoners released in 1994 for non-sexual crimes 
were much higher; in fact 67.5% of prisoners studied were 
rearrested for committing a crime three years later.227  
Meanwhile, only 43% of released sex offenders were 
rearrested for any type of crime three years following their 
release.228 Therefore, sex offenders do not have the highest rates 
of recidivism among released criminals. In fact, the rates of 
recidivism among sex offenders for committing another sex 
crime were the lowest among all released prisoners who were 
then rearrested for committing the same crime for which they 
were put in jail.229 For example, 13.4% of released robbers 
were rearrested for the same category of offense for which they 
were just in prison.230 
In addition, the Bureau of Justice surmises that by 
extrapolating on current data regarding sex crimes within their 
study “released sex offenders accounted for 13% and released 
non-sex offenders accounted for 87% of the 3,845 sex crimes 
committed by all the prisoners released in 1994.”231 This reveals 
that the most dangerous sex criminals are not in fact registered 
sex offenders, but rather other parolees who were guilty of 
crimes but who are not required to register under current 
                                                          
Patrick A. Langan, Erica L. Schmitt, and Matthew R. Durose, Recidivism of 
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2003). 
225 Id. at 24. 
226 Id. at 31. 
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228 See id. at 14 (emphasis added) 
229 See supra note 224 for a further discussion. 
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statutes.232 
VI. WORKABLE ALTERNATIVES 
This note has focused mainly on states that have 
implemented residence restrictions, but workable alternatives 
exist. Two states who have not implemented residency 
restrictions, Colorado and Minnesota, can offer insight into 
practical alternatives. 
In March of 2004 the Colorado Department of Public Safety 
issued a report for the legislature of Colorado studying the effect 
of sex offender living arrangements on community safety.233 The 
Minnesota Department of Corrections issued a similar report in 
January of 2003.234 After the results from these reports were 
disclosed to the state legislatures both bodies decided not to 
enact residence restrictions. Comparing these two reports reveals 
several themes and alternatives to sex offender registration 
including case-by-case treatment of each individual offender and 
supportive living situations/housing solutions. In addition, such 
current methods of offender monitoring as registry requirements, 
neighborhood notification and education are also effective 
solutions.235 
                                                          
232 An exception to this general statement is Montana, which is one of a 
few states that requires registration of violent offenders. Montana requires 
that violent offenders, or those convicted of specified crimes like assault, 
arson or homicide, register with local law enforcement along with sex 
offenders. Montana Department of Justice, Sexual and Violent Offender 
Registry, http://www.doj.mt.gov/svor/offendertypes.asp (last visited Dec. 7, 
2005). 
233 Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Safety: Div. of Criminal Justice—Sex Offender 
Mgmt. Bd., Report on Safety Issues Raised By Living Arrangements For and 
Location of Sex Offenders in the Community (2004). 
234 Minn. Dep’t of Corr., Level Three Sex Offenders Residential 
Placement Issues: 2003 Report to the Legislature (2003). 
235 For a good discussion of current methods and alternatives of 
monitoring and treating sex offenders see Henderson, supra note 102, at 
823-39. 
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A. Case-By-Case Evaluations 
An often cited solution to preventing recidivism among sex 
offenders is a case-by-case analysis of every sex offender and a 
tailoring of solutions to fit his or her individual needs.236 Every 
sex offender has a unique fingerprint of offense, with different 
triggers and victim characteristics.237 An effective solution to 
one offender’s problem might stoke the flames of another’s 
sickness. 
In addition to being effective and practical this solution 
would not have to be prohibitively expensive since before their 
release from prison most sex offenders must appear before 
parole boards who then evaluate each individual before 
release.238 Adding a comprehensive evaluation of the individual 
offender and a plan for parole would be a very effective and 
practical way of ensuring that each offender is treated in a way 
that will best prevent future offenses. Also, this will allow 
certain residence restrictions to be put in place for offenders that 
need this type of surveillance. Simultaneously, there will not be 
the problems associated with widespread blanket residence 
restrictions.239 As the Minnesota Department of Corrections 
stated, “since blanket proximity restrictions on residential 
locations of [offenders] do not enhance community safety, the 
current offender-by-offender restrictions should be retained.”240 
B. Housing Solutions 
Studies often cite the isolation of sex offenders as a mistake 
in the effort to prevent recidivism.241 “Research regarding 
dynamic risk has indicated that a lack of positive social support 
and depressed mood, anger and hostility are all associated with 
                                                          
236 See e.g., Levenson & Cotter, supra note 81. 
237 Id. 
238 Henderson, supra note 102, at 833. 
239 Id. at 823. 
240 Minn. Dep’t of Corr., supra note 234, at 11. 
241 Levenson, supra note 217, at 175. 
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recidivism.”242 Colorado pointed out that residence restrictions, 
by limiting housing options available to sexual offenders “may 
increase their risk of re-offending by forcing them to live in 
communities where safe support systems may not exist or in 
remote areas providing them with high degrees of 
anonymity.”243 
In fact, the Colorado study found that the offenders with the 
lowest recidivism rates where those who lived in Shared Living 
Arrangements with other convicted sex offenders. 244 The report 
stated that the success of the offenders in these types of 
arrangements is probably related to the fact that “offenders hold 
each other accountable for their actions and responsibilities and 
notify the appropriate authorities when a roommate commits 
certain behaviors.”245 In addition, the offenders are living with 
others who share the same temptations and desires to improve, 
so there is simultaneous support along with monitoring. In 
addition, these SLAs are not isolated from the rest of the 
community, so offenders are reintegrated back into society.246 
C. Offender Monitoring 
This note has already examined residence restrictions and 
their popularity and effectiveness.247 Registries have already 
been examined by the Supreme Court and found to be a 
constitutional expression of the legislative right to protect the 
health and safety of a state’s citizens. Also, all 50 states already 
have SORAs. SORAs are also an attractive solution because the 
primary burden is on the offender, as opposed to the 
                                                          
242 Id. 
243 Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, supra note 233, at 9. 
244 In general, Shared Living Arrangements (SLAs) are a small group of 
convicted sex offenders living together in a house. The offenders have the 
responsibility over the residence, whose location and composition is 
determined in advance by a provider of treatment and a supervising parole 
officer. Id. at 12-13. 
245 Id. at 13. 
246 See generally, Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, supra note 233, at 12-14. 
247 See discussion Part I.A. 
MEGHAN 3/7/2007 1:25 PM 
 SEX OFFENDERS AND RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS 329 
community. In short, registration requirements have many 
advantages over residence restrictions, including the fact that 
they have already been implemented, challenged and altered to 
fit each state’s own experiences.248 
Electronic monitoring refers to the use of global positioning 
technology to track convicted sex offenders.249 Parolees who 
qualify for these types of programs must wear an electronic, 
waterproof ankle band that is linked to a global positioning 
system (GPS) transmitter; if the wearer strays too far from their 
transmitter, an alert is sent to law enforcement authorities.250 
The GPS transmitters can be stationary or portable. The system 
can send alerts to law enforcement officials if the sex offenders 
approach areas like schools or child care facilities.251 Through 
the use of global positing technology, sex offenders can be 
monitored at all times and some states have even sentenced 
offenders to electronic monitoring for life.252 According to the 
experiences of Florida, one of the first and most active 
proponents of this type of monitoring, offenders under the GPS 
program are less likely to violate their paroles when compared 
to others under traditional modes of monitoring.253 The Jessica 
Lunsford and Sarah Lunde Act254 would have provided federal 
funding to implement these systems.255 Again, this form of 
monitoring has the advantage of some proof of effectiveness. 
                                                          
248 This can be seen by viewing the different requirements that each state 
has come up with to deal with the registration of its sex offenders. See 
generally Adams, supra note 11. 
249 Id. at 10. 
250 Wired News, States Track Sex Offenders by GPS, 
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D. Neighborhood Notification 
Informing parents and neighbors of a sex offender residing 
nearby is another way to prevent future offenses. Public 
notification of residential locations of [offenders] serves a 
valuable service and should continue. Community residents with 
this knowledge are able to determine what level of interaction 
they feel is acceptable for their family safety. The information 
raises awareness, dispels rumors and allows a greater knowledge 
of safety issues.256 
This method allows individuals to work with law 
enforcement officials in helping to prevent future offenses by 
keeping their families out of danger. It also spurns community 
involvement in the monitoring of sex offenders and could 
possibly calm parental fears and foster an understanding of the 
true threat posed by convicted sex offenders.257 
Concerns that notification might actually encourage 
community fears and promote vigilantism are already addressed 
through SORAs, which include provisions designed to punish 
those who use the information contained in such registries for 
unlawful purposes.258 
E. Education 
Education of both possible victims and sex offenders, when 
combined with the above solutions, is one of the most effective 
ways to prevent future sex offenses.259 Teaching children to 
beware of danger and to report inappropriate behavior will help 
to prevent abuse and will also improve our understanding of 
exactly how widespread sexual offenses are against children.260 
                                                          
256 Minn. Dep’t of Corr., supra note 234, at 11. 
257 Id. 
258 See supra note 21 for a further discussion. 
259 Congress has made education a priority in its newest efforts to 
combat sexual crimes. See generally, Adam Walsh Child Protection and 
Safety Act of 2006, H.R. 4472, 109th Cong. (2006). 
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Educating sex offenders about the nature of their offenses and 
who they hurt is considered to be an effective way of preventing 
re-offense and an essential tool in rehabilitating sex offenders.261 
By educating both sides, society may begin to address the causes 
of sexual offenses and prevent further offenses. 
CONCLUSION 
While on the surface residence restrictions appear to be a 
low cost and effective way of protecting the nation’s children, a 
deeper look reveals otherwise. Applying the framework, 
conclusions and even dicta from cases like Philadelphia,262 Mt. 
Laurel,263 and Smith264 reveal that residence restrictions are far 
from a simple solution. They raise constitutional issues as well 
as issues of fairness, not to mention practical concerns on the 
mobility of real property. After scrutinizing the Eighth Circuit’s 
decision in Miller265 problems become self-evident. 
Residence restrictions are based on widespread public 
misconceptions.266 Rates of recidivism are often cited 
improperly, not only by politicians, but by the courts 
themselves. In addition, there is a general lack of knowledge 
regarding what causes sex offenders to commit crimes against 
children. Finally, the criminal mindset of each individual sex 
offender could differ greatly.267 What might seem like a good 
solution to prevent one offender from re-offending would be the 
completely wrong punishment for another. Residence restrictions 
can also worsen the problem of monitoring sexual offenders by 
isolating them from society, aggravating housing problems, 
decreasing the ability to register and removing them from areas 
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where treatment options exist.268 
In addition to the above practical concerns, residence 
restrictions do not relate favorably to landmark property 
decisions and real estate ideals. First, courts have consistently 
rejected the concept of exclusionary zoning as a form of social 
management. Second, when municipalities construct residence 
restrictions for sex offenders they are often banishing such 
offenders from their towns. This has the result of unequally 
spreading the burden associated with sex offenders to other 
municipalities. Third, residence restrictions can be viewed as a 
type of constraint on the mobility and transferability of real 
property. Like restrictive covenants this can decrease the 
marketability of land. Therefore the burden of residence 
restrictions falls not only on convicted sex offenders but also on 
people wishing to sell their homes. Other considerations, such as 
voidability of real estate contracts between convicted sex 
offenders and sellers of homes, are raised by these statutes and 
are not addressed by the legislature—leaving vast areas of 
uncertainty caused by sex offender residence restrictions. 
Residence restrictions, while facially attractive, are unduly 
burdensome to both registered sex offenders and the 
communities that must eventually receive them. The presence of 
other methods of managing convicted sex offenders makes 
residence restrictions look even less attractive. With the 
prevalence of other less costly, less broad and more effective 
modes of control residence restrictions are truly unnecessary. 
There are ways of managing sex offenders without infringing on 
the mobility of real estate or the ideals of the constitution. 
Solutions exist, such as education and monitoring to address 
public fear and disgust towards sex offenders—solutions that can 
meet the needs of legislatures, law enforcement officials, 
parents, victims and the offenders themselves. 
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